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COOPERATIVE FORMATION AND FINANCIAL
CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS
BRENT HUETH, PHILIPPE MARCOUL, AND ROGER GINDER
Abstract. We use historical variation in the market share of agricultural
cooperatives to examine the nature of the cooperative rm. Our data in-
clude the share of sectoral output accounted for by cooperative rms across
15 commodity sectors during the period 1930-2002. We test a simple nan-
cial contracting model where the cooperative rm is viewed as a particu-
lar implementation of \monitored credit" (or \informed intermediation").
Controlling for sectoral and year eects, we nd support for the main pre-
diction of our model with a positive and statistically signicant relationship
between cooperative market share and real annual lending rates.
1. Introduction
The cooperative rm is somewhat of an enigma for economists. Although
considerable research eort has been directed at understanding the relative
merits of investor-owned and cooperative rms, little consensus has emerged
(Dow and Putterman, 2000).
1 There is arguably a better understanding of
the relative disadvantages of the cooperative rm than of its advantages. This
is not surprising given that one can view a cooperative rm as essentially an
additional layer of constraints imposed on an investor-owned rm. The most
important of these constraints include requirements that most of the rm's
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1The relevant literature is vast, and we do not attempt a comprehensive review here.
The interested reader can consult Bonin et al. (1993) and Dow (2003) regarding the labor-
managed rm. Parallel developments in the literature on agricultural cooperatives (which,
early on, proceeded many of the developments in the labor-managed-rm literature) are
nicely discussed in Sexton (1984).
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capital be provided by the rm's employees (or input providers in the case
of the agricultural marketing cooperative), and that rm decision making be
democratic. Thus, for example, one can point to wealth and credit constraints
faced by workers, and to consequent diculties in funding the rm's capi-
tal requirements, as a source of relative disadvantage. Similarly, preference
heterogeneity among cooperative members, and a lack of liquidity in member-
ship markets, together generate internal decision making frictions that are not
present in a publicly traded rm (Dow, 2001; Holmstr om, 1999). Much of the
theorizing along these (and other) lines has been motivated by the observation
that the cooperative rm is observed less frequently than its investor-owned
counterpart.
The genesis for our work comes from the complementary observation that
cooperative rms are often formed in declining industries. Or put another
way, cooperative rms seem to be sustainable in relatively low-return eco-
nomic environments that do not support private or investor-owned activity.
This observation suggests an apparent advantage of the cooperative rm. One
natural place to look for the source of this advantage is in the incentives that
can be provided to workers. For example, as Dow and Putterman (2000) point
out, \mutual monitoring, reductions in supervisory expenses, and strong work
incentives, are widely accepted stylized characteristics of worker-owned rms."
Certainly, if a cooperative rm can provide incentives to its workers that can-
not be replicated in a private rm, then the cooperative rm can be sustainable
in otherwise unsustainable environments. Add to that logic a deadweight cost
associated with the cooperative governance structure (which is a reduced-form
way of thinking about the points raised in our previous paragraph), and we
have a theory of the cooperative rm in which its emergence occurs mostly as
a response to \hard times." Later in the paper, we will develop this idea more
fully, but in essence this is our hypothesis.
There are two potential objections to this theory. The rst is a violation
of what Dow (2003) refers to as the \symmetry principle." On what grounds
should we treat a cooperative and investor-owned rm dierently in terms of
the incentives that can be provided to workers? Without being more specic
about the nature of such an asymmetry, this is really just an ad-hoc assump-
tion. The second potential objection regards the empirical evidence on which
the theory rests. The evidence regarding worker and grower buyouts that we
allude to above (and that we document more carefully in the next section) is
to some extent anecdotal in nature. Thus, one might argue that although the
theory is reasonably sound conceptually (ignoring objection 1 for the moment),
there is not strong empirical support one way or the other.
In this paper, we to some extent pass on the rst potential objection by
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hard times (or in the context of our model, to a binding nancial constraint).
We discuss other mechanisms that can implement identical incentives, and
argue that it is just a matter of comparing the relative cost of these alterna-
tives. Lacking information on such cost, but observing that cooperatives often
emerge in response to hard times, we conclude that apparently the cooperative
option is relatively low cost. However, we do not contribute any new theory on
the essential nature of this cost.
2 Instead, our main contribution is to address
the second objection. In particular, we have collected an extensive data set
regarding historical variation in the market share of agricultural cooperatives
across 15 commodity sectors during the period 1930-2002. With these data,
we test our \hard times" theory of cooperative activity by looking at variation
in market share in response to real lending rates. It turns out that a signicant
fraction of this variation can indeed be explained by the cost of borrowing, and
that the direction of this inuence is consistent with our theory.
In the next section we briey summarize and critique existing theory and evi-
dence regarding the motivation for cooperative activity in agricultural markets.
We then present our model of cooperative formation. Subsequent sections of
our paper are devoted to empirics, and concluding comments, respectively.
2. Cooperative Activity in Agriculture:
Theory and Evidence
Although there are many forms of cooperative activity in agriculture, among
the most prominent are those that involve the processing and marketing of
farmers' output. Perhaps surprisingly, many of the cooperative rms engaged
in this activity were at one time not cooperatives, but rather were non-farm
investor-owned rms that were subsequently purchased by farmers in response
to announced plant closings or scaling back of processing activities. For exam-
ple, American Crystal Sugar, the largest U.S. producer of rened beet sugar, is
a producer cooperative that was formed in 1973 with the purchase of the com-
bined assets of the investor-owned rm with the same name (American Crystal
Sugar Company, 2003). Similarly, the recent purchase of an Oscar Meyer meat
processing plant by a group of Iowa turkey growers occurred in response to an
announced plant closing (West Liberty Foods, 2003). Still more examples are
provided by Hetherington (1991, pp. 182-186) who notes how past growth in
2An apparently little recognized point which seems relevant for further thinking on this
issue is that cooperative legislation explicitly restricts outside ownership. One interpretation
of such a constraint is that it represents a (socially benecial) commitment device that
facilitates member participation. Thus, we echo Dow (2003, pg. 13) who suggests that
\problems of intertemporal credibility are therefore a prime hunting ground in looking for
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cooperative activity in California's fruit and vegetable canning industry can be
mostly explained by farmers purchasing abandoned investor-owned capacity.
The closing or scaling back of operations by a private rm is presumably an
indication of poor protability. What rationale can be provided for growers
to invest equity capital in such a venture? Hansmann (2000, p. 124) argues
that growers may choose to invest equity in a marginally valuable processing
facility if the alternative is one or a small number of oligopsony buyers. That
is, the return on investment in such a facility is made up of rm-level prots
plus any benet associated with inducing competitive pricing by other buyers.
However, in many of the examples where growers have taken over the activities
of a private rm, it has been the threat of no buyer that has motivated growers,
rather than the threat of a small number of oligopsony buyers. Moreover, if
growers can induce competitive pricing with cooperative activity, why should
we not also expect to see cooperative activity in settings with relatively high
market returns?
Alternatively, Staatz (1987) suggests that perhaps growers have fewer op-
portunities to invest their capital and are willing to accept a lower return on
investment than are non-farm investors. However, for this to be the case, one
would have to explain why the rm cannot simply negotiate a slightly lower
payment to growers as market conditions deteriorate.
In the context of non-agricultural labor markets, Ben-Ner and Jun (1996)
argue that \worker buyouts" act as a screening mechanism with respect to
the private information of rm managers. Management will never accept a
low price for the rm when future prospects are good, but may be willing
to pay relatively higher wages. Similarly, when future prospects are poor,
management will never pay higher wages, but may be willing to accept a
relatively low sale price. This argument has considerable intuitive appeal, but
ignores changes in the nancial and organizational makeup of the rm pre and
post buyout. That is, while it may be true that a buyout oer by growers
provides a means of eliciting information from rm managers, it remains to
be explained why growers should use their farm equity in the purchase? Why
cannot rm assets be used as collateral?
In addition to observations regarding the formation of individual cooperative
rms, the U.S. Department of Agriculture annually collects information on
aggregate cooperative activity across 15 dierent commodity sectors. Figure
1 is a graphical representation of this data. The measure of activity of gross
sales of cooperative rms, and to facilitate cross commodity comparisons in
variation across years, we have normalized each year of revenue by the the
average reported revenue across all years for which data is available in the
relevant commodity sector. Perhaps the most striking feature of these data is


































Figure 1. Cooperative market volume as a fraction of aver-
age volume over the entire period for which data is available
(indicated in axis label).
might expect a signicant degree of institutional inertia, there is apparently
quite a substantial amount of resource reallocation across cooperative and
noncooperative rms from one year to the next. Some of this reallocation sure
includes the formation and dissolution of cooperative rms, but is probably
also do to the scaling up or down of production with and across rm types.
In any case, we are unaware of any previous attempt to explain this observed
variation.
3. A \Hard Times" Theory of Cooperative Formation
In this paper, we propose a theory of cooperative formation that can explain
why cooperative rms sometimes emerge in response to \hard times," and that
can explain a signicant portion of the year-to-year variation in cooperative
activity observed in Figure 1. As briey noted in our introduction, we argue
that cooperative formation is a costly mechanism for increasing the power of
incentives farmers face. In addition to the \mutual monitoring, and reduction6 BRENT HUETH, PHILIPPE MARCOUL, AND ROGER GINDER
in supervisory expenses" referenced by Dow and Putterman (2000), by pledg-
ing farm assets to acquire processing facilities, farmers increase their collective
private cost of business failure, and this eectively increases the combined
\pledgeable income" (i.e., the amount available to pay lenders, after deduct-
ing the transfer that is needed to provide ecient incentives to farmers) of the
farming cum processing operation. However, if risking the forfeiture of farm
assets entails a deadweight cost, or if the cooperative governance structure is
inherently less ecient than other forms of governance, then we should only
expect cooperative formation when there is otherwise insucient pledgeable
income. This can happen, for example, when expected market returns are
suciently low, or when lending rates are suciently high.
Thus, the key ingredients in our explanation are an incentive problem be-
tween the processing rm and farmers, and a deadweight cost associated with
forming a cooperative or with pledging farm assets. Several contributions have
already argued that informational asymmetries at the level of the farm can ex-
plain the emergence of stronger vertical relationships in the agricultural sector
(e.g. Hennessy, 1996; Bogetoft and Olesen, 2003).
3 Our analysis diers from
these by focusing on the importance of farm-level assets in nancial contracts
between liquidity-constrained farmers and competitive lenders.
The notion that cooperative formation involves a deadweight cost, relative
to non-farm investor ownership, is meant to capture the idea noted by Hans-
mann (2000) and others (e.g. Fulton, 1999; Holmstr om, 1999; Rey and Tirole,
2001) that the restriction on passive ownership within a cooperative results
in a relatively illiquid market for ownership shares, and hence creates inter-
nal decision-making frictions that are not present in an investor-owned rm.
Similarly, we assume that asset seizure involves a deadweight loss to capture
the idea that there is a cost associated with the necessary legal transaction, or
alternatively (but equivalently for our purposes), because farmers have human
capital specic to these assets. We treat these two assumptions, together with
the assumption that there is moral hazard in farm production, as maintained
hypotheses in our analysis.
4 As we will demonstrate below, these assumptions
generate the prediction that the cooperative structure (involving asset pledg-
ing by farmers) can be an ecient response to high lending rates or low market
returns from processing.
3The general trade-o between vertical integration and separate ownership has been em-
phasized by Williamson (1985), who argues that vertical integration tends to weaken incen-
tives but improve the quality of information available for decision making. In contrast, as
we will show, \vertical integration" in our analysis involves an exchange of an organizational
deadweight loss for improved incentives.
4For evidence of moral hazard in settings with both private and cooperative agricultural
processing rms, see Hueth and Melkonyan 2004; Hueth and Ligon 1999; and Knoeber and
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Briey, we present a model in which we obtain two equilibrium organiza-
tional regimes, depending on the level of lending rates and market returns and
from the processing activity. When returns are relatively high or lending rates
are relatively low, both the private investor-owned rm and cooperative are
viable in the sense that both generate a positive expected social surplus. How-
ever, because cooperative ownership involves a deadweight loss, the non-farm
investor-owned structure is Pareto dominant. Though we are agnostic about
the exact distribution of gains from private versus cooperative ownership in
this regime, there is scope for the threat of cooperative formation to provide
some degree of rent transfer from the private owners to farmers.
5
When returns are relatively low or lending rates are relatively high, the non-
farm investor-owned rm exits the market because its returns no longer exceed
informational rents plus investment costs. When information rents are strictly
positive, there is thus some degree of credit rationing in that the project can
generate positive expected social surplus and yet not be implementable. As a
response, farmers can acquire the processing facility to continue production.
However, farmers are liquidity constrained and must nd a loan agreement
that both preserves incentives and allows the lender to recoup its investment.
When returns to the processing activity are suciently low or lending rates
are suciently high, the equilibrium loan agreement has farmers pledging farm
assets against the possibility of business failure, and we interpret the resulting
nancial contract as a \cooperative."
6 We characterize a region of market
returns and lending rates in which a cooperative of this sort is the only viable
organizational structure.
In what follows, we make these arguments more precise. We rst present
a simple model with complete separation between farm-level production and
processing. The processing rm contracts for delivery of a raw agricultural
input from farmers. There is moral hazard and limited liability by farmers.
Using an approach inspired by Holmstr om and Tirole (1997), we then intro-
duce a third party, the \outside investor," who can provide capital to farmers
wishing to form a cooperative to buy the rm. We then compare the viability
5The results of this regime are a simple version of those in Sexton and Sexton 1987, where
cooperative activity provides a degree of yardstick competition in an oligopoly market.
6According to Zeuli and Cropp (2004), \the three primary cooperative principles include:
user ownership, user control, and proportional distribution of benet." Our representation
of a cooperative captures the rst of these principles, though we have little to say about
the second and third. In eect, we assume that growers will control decision making when
they invest their farm equity in the purchase of processing and intermediation assets. State
and federal statues that govern cooperative activity formally restrict the degree of passive
ownership. Although costly in terms of access to nancing, such a restriction may help to
encourage investment by users if, for example, there is imperfect commitment in contracts
between between passive and active (i.e., \users") owners.8 BRENT HUETH, PHILIPPE MARCOUL, AND ROGER GINDER
of these these two organizational structures as a function of expected mar-
ket returns from processing, and present our main result that the cooperative
structure is the only viable organizational when market returns are suciently
low.
4. Model
Our economy is composed of three types of agents: farmers, non-farm or
\private" investors, and institutional investors. For simplicity, we assume that
individuals within each group of agent types are perfectly homogeneous, so
we can think of their being a single representative member of each type.
7
The representative farmer grows an essential input used in producing some
processed agricultural product. The farmer does not have the managerial
skills to run a processing facility but can acquire them at a cost.
The private investor possesses the ability to run a processing facility and
is not wealth-constrained. We assume, however, that private investors are
mobile and can operate in several markets; they can eventually exit the food
processing activity if the returns in this market are suciently low. A private
investor who wants to be active in the processing business must invest an
amount I > 0 to acquire the physical capital needed to process the agricultural
product. He then procures this input from the farmer. Production lasts for
one period and we assume that, at the end of the period, the residual value
of the processing plant is 0.8 Institutional investors are passive risk-neutral
investors, with no managerial skills. We assume that there exists a competitive
fringe of such investors who will lend only if they expect to recoup their initial
loan.
We assume that there is moral hazard in agricultural production. The qual-
ity of the nal output is uncertain and depends in part on unobservable (to
both private and institutional investors) actions of growers.9 For simplicity,
we assume there are only two possible outcomes. When the farmer is \dili-
gent," farm output is high-quality with probability Ph, whereas when the
farmer \shirks," output is high-quality with probability P` < Ph. We let
7Farmer heterogeneity is clearly a source of friction within the cooperative governance
structure and potentially a source of ineciency relative to a non-farm investor-owned rm.
In order to focus our analysis on the potential benets, rather than the costs, of the co-
operative structure, and to keep our model tractable, we do not model this heterogeneity
explicitly.
8This assumption is made for simplicity; the extension to the case in which the processing
facility has some salvage value is immediate.
9The term \quality" here is used for expositional ease. Output quantity and possibly
delivery timing are other attributes of farmers' output which may be stochastic and inu-
enced by unobserved actions of the farmer. The important point is simply that there is an
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the strictly positive dierence between these two probabilities be denoted by
P = Ph   P`. The farmer enjoys a private benet B > 0 in monetary units
from shirking (or equivalently, incurs a cost  B < 0 from being diligent). Rev-
enue of the processor is R when the output is high-quality and is normalized
to 0 when the output is low-quality.
These revenues are veriable, and to make our problem interesting, we as-
sume that that it is always ecient to induce diligence by the farmer:





We model cooperative formation as a Stackelberg game in which the leader
is a private investor who contemplates the opportunity to create a process-
ing facility. The investor must, however, take into account the ability of the
farmers to take collective action to create and operate their own processing
cooperative.
The timing of activities is as follows:
(1) The private investor decides whether to establish a processing facility.
He then makes a take-it-or-leave-it procurement oer to the farmer,
who decides whether to accept or reject the oer. If the oer is rejected,
the private investor exits the market and obtains his reservation utility.
(2) If the oer of the private investor has been turned down, the farm-
ers decide whether or not to acquire and run a processing facility by
eventually borrowing money from institutional investors. The insti-
tutional investors decide whether or not to lend money. If the loan
is refused, farmers produce for the \spot market" and earn zero net
expected utility.
(3) Production takes place and the farmers decide to be diligent or careless.
Neither the private investor nor the institutional investor observes the
farmers' choices.
(4) Processing is performed and outcomes are realized. Payments are made
according to the contracts signed either in step 2 or 3. The game ends.
We now turn to the situation in which private investors decide to be present
in the processing market.
4.1. Investor Financing. The problem of the private investor consists in
nding a pair of transfers (Th;T`) made to the farmer contingent on the pro-
cessor's revenue. The objective can be stated as
(1) V (R)  max
(Th;T`)
Ph(R   Th)   (1   Ph)T`10 BRENT HUETH, PHILIPPE MARCOUL, AND ROGER GINDER
subject to the following constraints:
(2) PhTh + (1   Ph)T`  U
(3) PhTh + (1   Ph)T`  P`Th + (1   P`)T` + B
and
(4) Th  0; T`  0:
The objective function of the processing rm states that the rm obtains net
revenue R Th with probability Ph and  T` with probability 1 Ph. The rst
constraint states that the farmer's reward has to be greater than expected
utility in his outside option given by U. Later we will take account of the
fact that the farmer's outside option is cooperative formation, but for now
we treat expected utility under the private investor regime as a parameter.
The incentive constraint (3) states that the farmer is induced to be diligent
and thus produces a high-quality input with probability Ph. The last pair
of constraints (4) characterize the farmer's limited liability; the private rm
cannot use unlimited punishments to induce the farmer to behave.
Note that we can rewrite the constraint set as T`  maxf0;U   BPh=Pg
and Th  B=P + T` > 0. Thus, when the farmer's expected utility in his
outside option is suciently high, the processor must pay the farmer a strictly
positive amount even when the project fails. Otherwise, it is possible to set
T` = 0, and pay the farmer just enough under project success to ensure that
the expected (public) payment from working is at least as large as the private
payo from shirking. Note that when the farmer's incentive compatibility and
participation constraints are satised, the limited liability constraint under
project success never binds. Moreover, given that the processor wishes to
minimize expected transfers to the farmer, it is straightforward to verify the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Procurement Contract). One solution of the program (1)-(4)
is given by the following transfers








+ T` > 0;
with expected surplus to the processor given by
V (R) = PhR   I   maxf
PhB
P
;Ug:COOPERATIVE FORMATION AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 11
The farmer derives an expected informational rent of Ph
B
P from his farming
activities. When these information rents exceed the farmer's outside option
expected utility U, it is possible to set T` = 0; otherwise the farmer must be
paid a positive amount in both outcome states and earns exactly his outside
option expected utility. The processor will undertake the processing activ-
ity when expected returns, V (R), are positive, and no processing activity is
undertaken by a private rm otherwise.
We now study the farmer's decision to launch a cooperative, possibly by
pledging their farm assets.
4.2. Cooperative Financing or \Pledging the Farm". Arguably, the
\cost of democracy" that underlies the cooperative governance mechanism
is the fundamental dierence between a cooperative and a private investor
owned rm. Thus, we assume that cooperative formation necessarily entails
a monetary cost, K > 0, borne by our representative farmer during the life
of the cooperative, and that this cost is independent of the cost of the assets
of the food processing plant, I. This assumption is the simplest possible way
to capture the idea that majority participation in rm-level decision making
necessarily entails a deadweight loss, relative to private-investor governance.
The farmer does not have sucient cash to cover the investment and organi-
zational cost, I+K, associated with the processing activity but does have some
illiquid assets like machines and acreages. These assets can be used as collat-
eral by the farmer in any loan that the institutional investors issue. The farmer
derives some utility from possession of these assets, and we assume that this
utility is equivalent for him to F monetary units. However, when these assets
are transferred to someone else, they are only worth f units, with F > f > 0.
Several interpretations can be given to this discrepancy in valuation. For ex-
ample, the farmer may have knowledge needed for ecient operation of the
collateralized assets that is both asset specic and costly to transfer. Alterna-
tively, a discrepancy may arise because farmers have a sentimental attachment
to their farms, or possibly because there is a deadweight transaction cost asso-
ciated with asset seizure itself. For the purposes of our model, a discrepancy
in asset valuation represents a strictly positive deadweight loss of F  f if the
asset is seized.10
The farmers have to invest an amount I+K to form a processing cooperative.
There exist several prospective lenders, with no managerial skills, who compete
in a Bertrand fashion in issuing a loan to the farmers. The loan contract
species how the two parties will share the revenue, R, in case of success, as
well as possible contingent rights for the lenders to seize the assets. Let Rf
10See Chan and Kanatas 1985 who also study nancial contracting with discrepancy in
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denote the farmers' share of income in case of success, where lenders receive
the residual R Rf, and let ys and yf denote the probabilities that the farmer
will have his farm seized (or equivalently, the fraction of total assets that the
farmer will give up) in case of success or failure, respectively .
The program of the farmer can be stated as
(5) U(R)  max
(Rf;ys;yf)
Ph(Rf   ysF)   (1   Ph)yfF
subject to
(6) Ph(Rf   ysF)   (1   Ph)yfF  P`(Rf   ysF)   (1   P`)yfF + B;
(7) Ph(R   Rf + ysf) + (1   Ph)yff  I + K;
and
(8) 0  ys  1; 0  yf  1:
The farmer undertakes the processing venture with borrowed cash. The
incentive constraint (6) states that the loan contract is structured in such a
way that farmers are induced to produce high-quality input with probability
Ph, which from Assumption 1 we know is ecient. The loan contract must
also meet the individual rationality constraint (7) of the lenders; that is, the
lenders must at least recoup their investment, I +K, on average. Finally, the
probabilities of asset seizure must be between 0 and 1.
The following lemma establishes that in the farmer's optimal loan contract,
it is never ecient to seize assets when the project succeeds, and that the
lender exactly breaks even.
Lemma 1. Any solution (R
f;y
s;y
f) to the loan contract that solves the farmer's
program (5)-(8) satises y
s = 0, and
(9) R








That the lender's rationality constraint is fully saturated can be easily ver-
ied by noting that Rf must be strictly positive to ensure that farmers earn
positive expected surplus, and moreover that for any solution in which the
constraint is slack, it is possible to increase Rf slightly without violating any
constraint, thus increasing expected surplus to the farmer.
Although it seems intuitively plausible that farm assets should not be seized
when the project succeeds, it is somewhat less straightforward to verify. To
see that this is indeed the case, rst use the fact that the lender's rationality
constraint binds to rewrite the farmer's objective function in (5) as PhR I  
K   q(F   f), where q = yf   Ph(yf   ys) represents the total probability of
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where seizing assets with probability q reduces expected surplus by q(F   f).
Clearly, q should be made as small as possible from this perspective. Making
the same substitution in the incentive constraint (6) and rearranging yields,




From this expression, it is clear that in any solution where ys > 0, it is pos-
sible to reduce ys slightly without violating any constraint. Doing so reduces
q, and thus increases expected payo to the farmer. Intuitively, it is never
ecient to use a transfer of assets as a means of transferring surplus from the
farmer to the lender. Any transfer of surplus from the farmer to the lender
that is needed to satisfy the lender's rationality constraint can be achieved at
lower cost by reducing Rf. Asset seizure is a costly incentive instrument and
is most eective when ys = 0.
Lemma 1 provides the solution of program (5) for any given probability
of asset seizure when the project fails, yf. The next result characterizes the
optimal yf when project revenues, R, decrease gradually.
Proposition 2 (Financial Contract). As the return R of the processing activity
decreases (equivalently, as I +K increases), the nancial contract passed with
lenders will have two regimes:
(1) (Cooperative with no pledging) When







farmers are able to pledge cash for repayment without pledging any
physical assets in any state of the world; that is, y
f = 0. Equilibrium
surplus for the farmer is given by
U(R) = PhR   I   K










f < R < R;




I + K   Ph(R   B=P)
PhF + (1   Ph)f
;
with equilibrium surplus for the farmer given by
U(R) = PhR   I   K   (1   Ph)y

f(F   f):
For lower values of R, farmers do not obtain a loan (although the co-
operative project may still have a strictly positive net value).14 BRENT HUETH, PHILIPPE MARCOUL, AND ROGER GINDER
Using Lemma 1, it is clear from (5) that yf should be zero unless it is needed
for incentive reasons. Thus, if yf > 0, we can nd its value from the farmer's
incentive constraint (6), which must be binding. If the value we nd here is
strictly greater than one, then




and the problem is infeasible: project revenues, combined with the collaterized
value of farm assets, are insucient to cover project costs and pay the farmer's
information rents. Proposition 2 is thus simply a matter of evaluating the
farmer's incentive constraint as a function of R. For future reference, note that
when y
f is strictly between zero and one, it is a strictly decreasing function of
R.
The relative magnitude of information rents and expected project surplus
(ignoring the deadweight loss from asset seizure) plays an important role in
the structure of the loan agreement. When the informational rent attached
to the farm product is smaller than expected project surplus (ignoring the
deadweight loss from asset seizure), there is sucient cash to repay lenders and
no need to collaterize the farm asset. In contrast, when informational rents
are suciently high, full contingent asset seizing may be necessary (y
f = 1) to
induce diligence by farmers.
Interestingly, these two cooperative regimes have characteristics resembling
organizational features found in some actual cooperatives. For instance, to
participate in a so-called \new generation cooperative," a farmer must con-
tribute signicant up-front equity to become a member.11 Harris et al. (1996)
note that these minimum up-front capital requirements are sometimes too high
for young equity-poor farmers, who are thus indirectly restricted access. Al-
though not universally the case, these new generation cooperatives have tended
to concentrate on \niche products" in which branding and organizational rep-
utation are important. It seems reasonable that, relative to the marketing
of a generic commodity, incentive provision is relatively important in such a
venture, or that, in the context of our model, information rents are relatively
high. Thus, our model seems to describe well the combination of signicant
equity investment coinciding with large information rents.
11New generation cooperatives have several other organizational features in addition to
the requirement of signicant equity contribution by farmers. Perhaps the most important of
these is that members have tradable (and appreciable) delivery rights associated with their
equity participation. The tradeability of delivery rights seems to play an important role
in addressing conicts among members with heterogeneous organizational tenure (i.e., the
\horizon problem"). For a recent formal treatment of the horizon problem in cooperatives,
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Proposition 2 also has some policy implications. When returns are su-
ciently low, farmers are credit rationed and cannot create their cooperative.
This occurs when
(1   Ph)(F   f) < PhR   I   K < Ph(
B
P
  F)   (1   Ph)f;
so that the project is not feasible but is socially valuable. In this case, expected
project returns plus the expected value of farm assets that are seized in the
case of failure are insucient to cover expected project costs which include
both the investment and organizational costs, and the information rents of
farmers. Note that this outcome implies that PhB=P > F, or that expected
information rents are large in comparison with the farmer's asset valuation. In
this case, providing secured loans or subsidies to farmers can enable coopera-
tive activity that generates positive expected social surplus (ignoring the cost
of government funds) but that would be otherwise infeasible. In our model, a
secured loan or subsidy to farmers would act like an increase in R or a decrease
in I + K. However, for incentive purposes, it is important to let the farmers
bear the project risk.
5. Comparison of Investor and Cooperative Financing
The aim of this section is to characterize situations in which we expect to
observe private rms or cooperatives. The next results, which are the main
results of the paper, discuss the existence, as an equilibrium outcome, of each
type of processing organization.
We rst state an assumption that provides a pair of necessary conditions
for the equilibrium emergence of cooperative activity.










The rst inequality, which we can rewrite as K < PhF +(1 Ph)f says that
the expected value of the farm asset, given that it is pledged, is larger than
the cost of cooperative organization. Viewing the expected value of the farm
asset as a component of the \project" value, this assumption says that the
amount that the farmer contributes to the project must be at least as large as
the additional cost which is incurred to accommodate farmer participation in
management. Alternatively, this inequality can be viewed as simply a restric-
tion on the magnitude of K. There is no scope for cooperative activity when
the necessary organizational costs are suciently high.
The second inequality ensures that the farmer always receives positive ex-
pected surplus from cooperative activity. To see this, note that U(R) evaluated16 BRENT HUETH, PHILIPPE MARCOUL, AND ROGER GINDER
at y




  F)   (1   Ph)F:
Imposing the condition U(R) > 0 yields the second inequality in Assumption
2. Thus, if the farmer is to be made at least as well o as in his outside
option (which, recall, we assume is the \spot market" yielding a net expected
utility of zero), then information rents from the cooperative venture must be
relatively large in comparison with the value of assets that are pledged.
Using Assumption 2, we now present a proposition that summarizes equi-
librium organizational structure as a function of project returns, R.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium organization). Under Assumption 2, as R in-
creases, we observe the following exclusive sequence of processing organiza-
tions:
 If R < R, no organization is formed; farmers sell their product on the
\spot market" and earn zero expected utility.
 If







then a cooperative with asset collateralization is the unique equilibrium
organization. The structure of its nancial contract with the lender is
described in Proposition 2.
 If Rp  R  R, then processing activities are exclusively performed by
the private rm. Its procurement contract with the farmer is described
in Proposition 1.
 If R  R, then processing activities are performed by a private rm, but
against threat of entry by a cooperative rm. The farmer's procurement
contract is as described in Proposition 1.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is a straightforward comparison of the
various regimes characterized in Propositions 1 and 2, under Assumption 2.
In Proposition 2, we have already shown that the cooperative is not sustainable




)   I < K   (PhF + (1   Ph)f) < 0;
which, using Assumption 2, demonstrates that a private rm is also not feasi-
ble.
Next, note that Assumption 2 ensures R < Rp. Thus, there is an interval
where the farmer's incentive compatibility constraint can be satised in the
cooperative organization. However, we still need to ensure that the cooperative
members earn positive expected surplus in the interval between R and Rp whileCOOPERATIVE FORMATION AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 17
the private processor does not. This is easily veried, again using Assumption
2, by direct substitution into the expressions for U(R) and V (R).
For R between Rp and R, the private processor earns strictly positive re-
turns, while the farmer receives PhB=P > U(R), so that he does better with
the processor than by forming a cooperative. For R suciently large, the pri-
vate processor earns K > 0, while the farmer earns expected project surplus
PhR I minus K, which makes him exactly indierent between producing for
the processor and forming a cooperative. 
These arguments can be presented graphically by assuming that farmers
must pledge all or none of their assets to the cooperative venture, or that
yf 2 f0;1g, and that R < Rp so that T` = 0 in the rm's procurement problem.
In the rm problem, when the project succeeds, the farmer must be paid at
least the information rents B=P, while the private investor must receive at
least I=Ph so that expected project surplus is positive. Thus, the project
revenue R must be at least as large as B=P + I=Ph. In Figure 1, we have
drawn the relevant constraint set for the private investor so that the project
is just feasible. In the cooperative problem, the farmer must earn at least
B=P F, while investors must earn at least (I+K)=Ph f(1 Ph)=Ph. Thus,
there is a region of feasibility for the cooperative that is outside the feasible
region for a private rm, provided that (I +K)=Ph f(1 Ph)=Ph < I=Ph+F
as indicated in the gure. This inequality is the rst part of Assumption 2.
Figure 2 summarizes the results of Proposition 3 in terms of expected social
surplus. Under the assumptions of our analysis, a cooperative is less protable
than a private investor-owned rm when the returns of the processing activity
are relatively high. Thus, at Rp there is a discrete jump in social surplus
as project returns are reduced slightly, and the only feasible organizational
structure is the cooperative. Moreover, as returns fall still further, the rate of
decrease in expected social surplus is greater in the cooperative organization
than in a private rm (at higher R); this is because in addition to the loss in
social surplus resulting from a reduction in R, farmers must pledge additional
assets which generate a further deadweight loss. When returns are suciently
low, some credit rationing can appear as farmers cannot credibly commit to
repaying loans to lenders.
The results of Proposition 3 suggest that cooperatives with asset pledging
tend to emerge not because farmers choose to develop a product with high
returns (i.e., a high R) but rather because they are the only feasible organi-
zational structure. One possible implication is that cooperatives be relatively
preponderant in low-return segments of the agricultural sector. Parliement



















Figure 2. Project feasibility with and without pledging by the
farmer. Axes represent payos under project success, with the
farmer on the horizontal axis and the investor on the vertical
axis.
In particular, they note that dairy cooperatives tend to concentrate their ac-
tivity in the low-value uid milk segment of the industry. Staord and Roof
(1984) make a similar observation.
The cost of collective decision making plays an important role in our analy-
sis. If a cooperative organization is to be feasible, it must choose a venture in
which these costs are relatively low. Empirical observations by Zusman (1982)
and Fulton (1990) show that New generation cooperatives (NGCs) are usually
devoted to one commodity and therefore tend to have less conict of inter-
est than private, investor-owned rms, which tend to be involved in multiple
commodity segments.
Interestingly, the farmer-specic valuation also matters in our analysis. In-
deed, a higher F relaxes the incentive constraint even if the pledged assets
have a small tradable value. Thus, these assets are likely to be included in the
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Figure 3. Expected social surplus and equilibrium organiza-
tional structure as a function of market returns, R.
cooperative formation in the Upper Midwest have adopted NGC-like organiza-
tional characteristics. One of the most recurrent characteristics is a minimum
up-front investment. Increases in the nancial value of the collateral, f, and
the level of informational rent also favor existence of the cooperatives with
asset pledging. An increase in information rents makes the provision of incen-
tives through asset pledging more important, and increases in f reduce the
deadweight cost of using these incentives.
Finally, Proposition 3 emphasizes that cooperatives can only be viable when
the extra organizational costs associated with the cooperative activity, K +
(1   Ph)(F   f), are small relative to information rents that must be paid to
the private investor, BPh=P. The existence of cooperatives thus relies on
the ability of farmers to internalize information rents as a source of revenue
for the processing rm. Processing cooperatives as such represent a means by
which farmers perform vertical integration. The cost of this form of vertical
integration is the deadweight loss of collective decision making and the cost of
exposing farm assets that have a specic value to the possibility of seizure by
a third party.20 BRENT HUETH, PHILIPPE MARCOUL, AND ROGER GINDER
6. Empirics
Our model predicts that a cooperative rm is nancially feasible in a larger
class of economic environments than a private investor-owned rm (but that
a private rm dominates when both are feasible). To test this prediction,
it is necessary to observe variation in the relevant economic environments
and corresponding variation in the formation and dissolution of rms. Of
the measurables in our model, variation in lending rates oer perhaps the
best opportunity for such a test. Lending rates can plausibly be viewed as
exogenous to each individual agricultural sector, and they are relatively easily
measured. Unfortunately, we do not observe the formation and dissolution
decisions of individual rms. However, if cooperative activity is in large part a
response to the exit of nancially distressed private rms, then the aggregate
market share of cooperative rms should rise in response to the price of credit.
Figure 6 is a simple scatter plot of the relevant comparative static where we
have used one period lags of the real the interest rate. With the exception of
two commodity sectors (\nuts" and \other"), there appears, at least visually,
to be a fairly strong positive relationship. In the rest of this section we develop
an empirical model to test this apparent regularity more carefully and discuss
various caveats regarding the construction of our data.
Consider a population model for the average market share yit of cooperative
rms in sector i and period t,
(10) yit =  + rt 1 + bi + uit;
where ri;t 1 is the lagged real interest rate, bi is a sectoral xed eect, and uit is
a disturbance term which we assume has conditional expectation E[uitjrt;bi] =
0 for all t.
The data for our empirics come from two sources. Information on aggre-
gate cooperative activity come from U.S. Department of Agriculture (2004),
while information on aggregate total market activity come from various years
of U.S. Department of Agriculture (2000). The rst of these publications mea-
sures sectoral revenues of cooperative rms after processing, while the latter
measures sectoral revenues of all farms at the farm gate. Assuming competi-
tion in the processing sector, we can write revenues at the level of the rm as
the sum of farm wages w and processing costs c. Thus, while we would like
to observe y = qc=qT, where qc and qT are the aggregate sectoral outputs of
cooperative and all rms, respectively, we instead observe ~ y = sqc=qT, which
diers from y by the term s = (w+c)=w, or the inverse of the farm level share
of retail cost.
One way to deal with our mismeasured y is to instead model the population
distribution for the log ~ y = logy + logs. In this case, we can accommodate
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Figure 4. Cooperative market share versus federal prime rate,
1930-2002.
that our estimating equation becomes,
(11) logyit = t + rt 1 +~ bi + uit;
where t =  + st, and ~ bi = bi + si. For this correction to be valid, we must
assume that sit can be written as the additive sum of an aggregate year aect
plus a sectoral eect.12
Table 1 reports regression results from the specications in equations (10)
and (11), where we suppress reporting individual sectoral and time eects. In
all cases, the interest rate has a statistically signicant and positive eect on
cooperative market share. At this point, our results are preliminary, as we
would like to explore a dynamic specication for our model that allows from
12Alternatively, we could use USDA data on the aggregate farm level share of retail cost
across all sectors to adjust our observed ~ y. The USDA reports this measure across individual
commodity sectors, but for sectoral denitions that do not match those used in our data on
cooperative activity, and only for the years 1946-2002 (see U.S. Department of Agriculture,
2000, Chapter 9, Table 9-29). As a result, making this correction would force us to drop 16
years of data from our sample, and all but two commodity sectors.22 BRENT HUETH, PHILIPPE MARCOUL, AND ROGER GINDER
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some degree of institutional inertia (for example, by including lagged y in our
estimating equations). It seems reasonable to expect that the the year t level
of cooperative activity should inuence activity in t 1. The row labeled \" in
Table 1 is the parameter obtained from regressing ^ ut on ^ ut 1 and should not be
signicantly dierent from zero under a no-serial-correlation hypothesis. The
outcome of this test indicates marginal support for some degree of positive
serial correlation and thus warrants further testing.
7. Conclusion
This paper tests a \hard times" theory of cooperative formation using his-
torical data on cooperative activity in agricultural markets. We rely on two
key maintained hypotheses in developing our theory. First, there is an agency
problem between workers and rm management, and workers in a cooperative
rm earn fewer informational rents than their counterparts in an investor-
owned rm. And second, the governance structure used in a cooperative rm
entails a deadweight loss relative to that used in an investor-owned rm.
The justication for our rst assumption is based partly on the common
sense notion that there are economies of scale in supervisory activities. In
addition (though this is somewhat specic to the context of agricultural mar-
kets), there is also the fact that cooperative members typically leverage some
portion of their physical assets to satisfy the rm's capital requirements. One
way to interpret this observations is that it represents a mechanism for relax-
ing a limited liability constraint (if the rm fails, farmers lose their assets),
with a resulting decrease in informational rents.13
13We do not explain why similar outcomes cannot be achieved in a private rm by having
farmers pledge their assets to a third party. Even if it seems reasonable to suppose that
farmers who pledge assets to nance a risky project will exercise some degree of manage-
rial control over the project (and hence govern \cooperatively"), the reason remains to be
explained. One possibility is that a third party introduces opportunities for collusion and
this is costly to police. Alternatively, Martinez (1999) notes that private processors in theCOOPERATIVE FORMATION AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 23
Our second maintained assumption is meant to capture the idea noted by
Hansmann (2000) and others (e.g. Fulton, 1999; Holmstr om, 1999; Rey and
Tirole, 2001) that the restriction on passive ownership within a cooperative
results in a relatively illiquid market for ownership shares, and hence creates
internal decision-making frictions that are not present in an investor-owned
rm. Or equivalently for our purposes, when farmers pledge their own physical
assets against the rm, they risk losing those assets in the event the rm fails. If
farmers have human capital that is specic to these assets, then the possibility
of asset seizure involves an expected deadweight loss to society.
We present two kinds of data to support our hypothesis. On the one hand,
there is anecdotal and case-study evidence that cooperative rms often emerge
in response to the exit of private rms, and that cooperative rms in general
are sustainable in economic environments that cannot support the activity of
a private investor-owned rm. Moreover, we demonstrate an apparent positive
causal relationship between annual real lending rates and the level of cooper-
ative activity across 15 commodity sectors during the years 1930-2002. Both
sources of evidence support our hypothesis that the cooperative organizational
structure facilitates nancing that would otherwise not be available.
To some extent, our theory is an amalgam of existing theories. In particular,
other authors have argued that cooperatives improve the provision of incentives
to workers. A mostly dierent set of authors has argued that cooperative gov-
ernance procedures are costly, relative to those used in investor-owned rms.
However, to the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of other research that
pulls these two pieces together as the key ingredients in a model of cooperative
formation. Indeed, our view of the cooperative suggests an alternative to the
prevailing view (e.g. Dow and Putterman, 2000; Bonin et al., 1993) that a
key disadvantage of the cooperative is its lack of access to external nancing.
Though not modeled explicitly, our theory suggests that this lack of access
may be a necessary requirement to elicit the internal nancing that comes
from cooperative members. In this sense, access to nance is a key advantage
of the cooperative rm.
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